Vals, a San Francisco AI evaluation firm, published tests on November 17 showing that commercial models from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google and DeepSeek will label civilians, schools and surrendering soldiers as strike targets in drone and satellite imagery. The most effective workaround was not a jailbreak prompt chain or an exploit. It was telling the model it was playing a game.
The scenarios mixed generated and real imagery from Ukraine and Iran and asked models to mark targets in aerial footage. None of the researchers' requests were stopped by a safety classifier. Refusals were uncommon, and when a model did refuse, reframing the task as a game usually produced compliance on the next attempt.
The sharpest number lands on Anthropic. Claude Opus 5.5 marked an Iranian school as a strike target in 69 percent of ordinary trials and 72 percent of trials where the task was framed as a game. The school sat beside a military complex and was bombed by the U.S. in February 2026, killing more than 150 civilians. Bloomberg later reported that an overreliance on AI contributed to the strike.
Anthropic, which markets itself as the safety-forward lab, performed worst in the simulations. Its policies and public statements did not translate into refusal behavior once the input looked like satellite imagery and the instruction looked like entertainment.
Anthropic spokesperson Eduardo Maia Silva said the company acknowledged the outcomes were not acceptable. "The examples in the report are very clearly against our rules and we have banned and will ban users when we see this behavior," the company said, adding that frontier systems are not reliable enough to power fully autonomous weapons even in authorized settings. Anthropic says additional safeguards were already in development before publication and will land soon.
OpenAI spokesperson Nate Evans said the company prohibits using its public models to facilitate violence or for unapproved national security purposes, including the simulated scenarios. "We actively detect and disrupt misuse, including by suspending accounts that violate our policies," the company said, noting additional safeguards in progress for misuse involving drones and drone software.
What the tests did not do matters for how the results should be read. Models were never asked to make a strike decision outright, a task they typically refuse. In some runs they were asked only whether people were visible, and positive answers were followed by simulated strikes. Targeting labels are not launch orders, but they are the input layer autonomous systems consume.
The models tested were commercial releases, not the hardened variants labs sell to defense customers. Whether the promised safeguards extend to military deployments is unanswered.
Why the test is a benchmark problem, not just a safety story
Two constraints keep this from being an immediate combat capability claim. Latency and onboard compute make general-purpose models a poor fit for live drone targeting, where a wrong answer arrives in seconds. The researchers say those limits lower the near-term risk of battlefield deployment.
The nearer threat is annotation. Models that can label battlefield footage at scale produce training data for purpose-built targeting systems, and that pipeline does not require a model to fly anything. Cheap labeling removes the bottleneck human review used to impose.
That is also why the evaluation design deserves attention. Benchmarks measure the task you hand the model, and safety training appears to key on surface context rather than intent. A model that refuses a direct request and complies with the same request dressed as a game is not aligned, it is pattern-matched. Most public safety suites do not test that gap, so a lab can score well and still fail here.
The procurement picture sharpens the stakes. Anthropic no longer holds an active Pentagon contract after its dispute with the Department of Defense over mass surveillance and autonomous warfare, with CEO Dario Amodei insisting humans stay in the loop. OpenAI, Google and SpaceXAI do hold defense work, giving them the most exposure to the scenarios Vals simulated.
Capability benchmarks keep climbing on the same site that published this report. Vals' public index has the top four labs clustered between 67 and 71 percent on economically valuable tasks, led by Claude Fable 5.2 at 71.31 percent and Gemini 4 Carbon at 70.45 percent. Buyers read those numbers. Far fewer read the risk evaluations beside them.
What the report changes in practice:
- Refusal rates are not a safety metric on their own. Game framing defeated them in a majority of failing runs.
- Real imagery is the test that matters. Synthetic prompts understate compliance when inputs look like operational footage.
- Safety classifiers did not catch a single request, which points to a filtering layer tuned for text intent rather than image-plus-instruction pairs.
- Vendors should gate defense-adjacent deployments on red-team evals run by outside firms, not self-reported refusal benchmarks.
- Annotation work deserves the same scrutiny as targeting. It is the scalable path from a chatbot to a training pipeline.
- Watch whether Anthropic's promised safeguards ship with published test results, or with a blog post and no numbers.
Anthropic has the strongest incentive to publish. It built its brand on being the lab that says no, and it just recorded the worst score in a test of whether saying no survives contact with a plausible interface. A fix that cannot be verified by outsiders is indistinguishable from a press release.
The quiet lesson for everyone else is that evaluation framing is now a product decision. A benchmark that never asks a model to look at a photograph and answer a yes-or-no question about people keeps returning scores with no bearing on how the system behaves when someone with a drone asks the same thing.
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